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FALSE CLAIMS ACT-THE TENTH CIRCUIT FAILS TO
FULLY CONSIDER THE HARM TO PUBLIC POLICY
CAUSED BY ENFORCEMENT OF A PREFILING RELEASE
AGREEMENT IN A QUI TAM ACTION: UNITED STATES EX
REL. RITCHIE V. LOCKHEED MARTDV CORP.
KELLY FLANAGAN*

Ir7NITED STATES ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ana(Jlyzes the enforceability of a release agreement between private parties where the releasing party subsequently files a qui
tam False Claims Act (FCA) suit as a relator for the United
States.' The qui tam section of the FCA allows private persons
to bring actions as relators for the government against those
who have committed fraud upon it and guarantees most relators
a portion of the proceeds from the action or postfiling settlement, regardless of whether the government intervenes.' The
few courts that have addressed the enforceability of prefiling settlements have turned to the Rumery test set forth by the Supreme
Court, which balances the interests in enforcing the release
against the harm to public policy caused by enforcement.' The
Ritchie court held that the interest in encouraging settlements
outweighed the public policy of qui tam FCA suits since the al* J.D. Candidate 2011, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.B.A. 2003, University of North Texas. The author would like to thank her
parents for their love and support throughout the years.
I 558 F.3d 1161, 1167-71 (10th Cir. 2009).
2 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(b)(1),
(d)(2) (2006). When
the government intervenes, taking primary control of the qui tam litigation, the
relator is typically entitled to 15% to 25% of the proceeds, as compared to the
25% to 30% guaranteed where the government leaves the relator to bring the
action alone. Id. §§ 3730(d) (1), (2).
3 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see, e.g., United States
ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 917 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the prefiling release was enforceable under the Rumeiy test since a settlement
entered into during bankruptcy does not harm FCA public policy); United States
ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 969 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the prefiling release was unenforceable under the Rumery test since barring a qui
tam action which uncovered fraud would significantly harm FCA public policy).
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leged fraud had been disclosed to the government prior to the
release.'
Ruth Ritchie worked for Lockheed and its predecessors for
twenty-five years before being voluntarily terminated in accordance with a settlement agreement in 2005.6 Beginning in
2002, she became responsible for overseeing and authenticating
two databases which held information about Lockheed's employee pay incentives for U.S. Air Force contracts.' That same
year, Ritchie internally reported her concern that "Lockheed
managers were falsifying records to increase incentive payments
to Lockheed employees."' She reported the problem again to
Lockheed in May 2003, convinced that corrective actions taken
by the contractor had not fixed the inaccuracies.8 After further
internal investigation, Lockheed dismissed some of Ritchie's
claims as unsubstantiated and concluded that the remaining inaccuracies did not result in overstated incentives, and thus, the
Air Force had not been overcharged.'
Lockheed notified the Air Force about the fraud allegations
and the favorable findings of its internal investigation after
Ritchie's May 2003 complaint.' 0 The Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) then undertook its own audit where Ritchie acted as the Lockheed point of contact and communicated with
DCAA's auditor several times before the agency decided to refer
the allegations to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service."
During the government's investigation, Ritchie sought damages
from Lockheed for alleged retaliation related to her
whistleblowing activities.1 2 The two parties reached a settlement
agreement in 2004, about a year before DCAA issued its final
audit.'" The settlement provided for Ritchie's termination and
Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1169-70.
Id. at 1164-65.
6 Id. at 1164.
7 Id.
8 Id. The complaint also included allegations of retaliatory behavior by her
supervisors. Id.
9 Id.
4
5

10 Id.

11 Id. at 1164-65. DCAA initially limited the scope of their investigation to a
single database and fiscal year, but later expanded this scope based on Ritchie's
input. Id. at 1164-65.
12 Id. at 1165.
13 Id. at 1164-65. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court indicated any
consideration of the DCAA's findings. See generally Ritchie, 558 F.3d 1161; United
States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 04-cv-01937-EWN-MJW, 2008
WL 608586 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2008).
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the general release (the Lockheed Release) of claims by her
against Lockheed.14 Shortly after the settlement, Ritchie filed
this qui tam action under the FCA." Enforcing the release
agreement, the District Court of Colorado granted Lockheed
summary judgment.'" Ritchie appealed, arguing that enforcement "would frustrate the policies of the FCA."1 7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the enforceability
of the release agreement and affirmed summary judgment for
Lockheed." After determining that the Lockheed Release covered the qui tam claim, the Ritchie court applied the Rumery balancing test to determine whether the release was enforceable.' 9
Since Lockheed had notified the federal government of the
fraud allegations before the settlement with Ritchie, allowing
the government to investigate the claims, the court found that
the federal interest in encouraging such disclosures and settlements outweighed the potential harm to the public's interest in
uncovering fraud under the FCA.2 0
Though contract enforceability is normally considered under
state law, the Ritchie court turned to the Rumery test under federal common law so as not to frustrate the FCA goal of deterring
and remedying fraud.21 The court explained that varying treatments of prefiling qui tam settlements amongst states would
likely lead to forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking to optimize
their recovery.22 Since the FCA limits postfiling recovery by relators to a percentage of the amount recovered and remains silent
on prefiling settlements, the Ritchie court noted that a government contractor could settle with a would-be relator for less
than the contractor would pay in a qui tam action but more
than the would-be relator would receive under the FCA.2 3
Therefore, the court felt that a uniform federal approach was
necessary to "protect[ ] the federal government's right to recover under the FCA" and followed the approach of the Ninth
14 Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1165. The release language stated that Ritchie released
"any and all claims [she] might have arising under federal, state or local law." Id.
at 1167.
15 Id. at 1165.
16 Id. at 1167.
17 Id. at 1167-68.
18 Id. at 1163-64.
19 Id. at 1167, 1169-71.
20 Id. at 1171.
21 Id. at 1168-69.
22 Id. at 1169.
23 Id. at 1168-69.
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Circuit Court of Appeals in applying the Rumery balancing test
to determine release enforceability. 24
The Ritchie court compared two Ninth Circuit cases when
weighing the interests in enforcing the Lockheed Release
against the harms posed to the FCA's public policy by its enforcement.2 5 In United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., the
Ninth Circuit held a release unenforceable where the government only learned of the fraud allegations upon qui tam filing;26
whereas in United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany,
the Ninth Circuit held a release enforceable where, prior to the
settlement, the government had full knowledge of the allegations and found them to be unsubstantiated upon investigation.2 ' The Ritchie court likened the circumstances of the.
Lockheed release to Hall since Lockheed had notified the Air
Force and DCAA of the allegations before settling with Ritchie.2"
The court indicated that by uncovering fraud, Lockheed's disclosure helped serve the FCA's policy interests. 29 The court acknowledged, however, that unlike Hall, there was still a federal
interest in having Ritchie supplement FCA enforcement at the
time of the release due to DCAA's ongoing investigation."o The
court determined that the interest in encouraging settlements
and disclosures outweighed this concern though and held that
the Lockheed release was enforceable.
Judge Briscoe dissented from the majority, arguing that Hall
fails to fully account for the public policies underlying the
FCA.3 2 Referencing the Senate Report on the False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986 (the 1986 Report), he pointed out
that in updating the FCA, Congress intended to "supplement[ ]
Government efforts to recoup monies lost due to fraud" as well
as to encourage insiders to report fraud against the government. 3 Concerned with the implications of Hall regarding the
government's compensatory interests, he noted that a lack of
resources may prevent the government from independently fil24

25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32

33

Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170-71.

59 F.3d 953, 966, 969 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussed at Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1169).
104 F.3d 230, 231-33 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussed at Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1169).
Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1170 n.7.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1171.
See id. at 1174.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), rprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,

5266-67.
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ing suit on meritorious allegations and that Hall nonetheless allows private parties to "bargain away the Government's claim."3 4
Judge Briscoe proposed that prefiling releases should only be
enforceable with the Attorney General's express written
consent.35
The Tenth Circuit appropriately recognized the federal interest in dealing uniformly with qui tam FCA releases amongst the
states but failed to fully account for the public policy behind
these claims in adopting the Hall analysis." Even though there
is a legitimate public interest in encouraging settlement over litigation, FCA policy interests would be significantly harmed if private parties were allowed to reach financial agreements
releasing qui tam claims at the expense of the government's
compensatory interests. 37 The 1986 Report indicates that the
overall purpose of the reform was "to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud
against the Government" and that a lack of resources was "perhaps the most serious problem" in the government's enforcement efforts against fraud. It also explained that 1986 qui tam
statutory changes guaranteeing relators a portion of the action
or settlement's proceeds were specifically intended "to encourage more private enforcement suits."3 9 In applying Hall,
the Ritchie court fails to recognize the important role of the qui
Id. at 1174-75.
Id. at 1175. Judge Briscoe explained that the government could then preserve its compensatory interest in a potential suit simply by refusing consent or
requiring satisfactory disclosure before granting consent. See id. However, this
requirement may be an impractical demand on government resources as contractors would likely seek consent on all general releases to ensure full protection.
36 See id. at 1169. In United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., the
Western District Court of Virginia similarly critiques Hall, observing that a government investigation does not negate the public interest in a qui tam FCA suit,
"which includes not only disclosing information to the government, but also potentially investigating and prosecuting the case on behalf of the government,"
allowing it to recover funds lost due to fraud. 582 F. Supp. 2d 766, 780 n.10
(W.D. Va. 2008).
3 For instance, counting on the government's inability to prosecute a complicated or questionable fraud claim due to a lack of resources, a government contractor could effectively cut the government out of a settlement. See Ritchie, 558
F.3d at 1168-69 (explaining how both the contractor and relator may benefit
more from a private settlement than a qui tam action). This poses a serious
threat to FCA policy since the settled claim revolves around a statute established
for the purpose of returning funds to the government.
38 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1, 7.
- Id. at 23-24, 27-28.
34
35
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tam action in achieving the FCA's primary goal-recovering
money lost by the government.4 0
Moreover, release enforceability as a disclosure incentive does
not further the FCA's policy of uncovering fraud since the government would likely learn of any actual fraud through a relator's qui tam suit or a contractor's disclosure anyway. Disclosure
incentives under the FCA are not aimed at government contractors, but rather, target individuals, as FCA qui tam actions rely
on the "strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain"
to accomplish its goals." Contractors will likely only disclose
possible fraud when it is in their best interest to do so, such as
where the claims are meritless or where discovery is highly probable anyway. An increased likelihood of discovery exists where
an employee has filed repeated internal complaints as in Ritchie
or where an eventual outside audit would reveal fraud.
Where the claims are meritless, contractors falsely accused of
fraud need not rely on release agreements to protect them since
the FCA discourages such allegations by awarding attorney fees
and expenses to defendants for frivolous claims.4 2 Encouraging
disclosure of these unfounded claims through release enforcement does not further the FCA goal of uncovering fraud.
Where the government is already likely to discover unresolved
claims of fraud or actual fraud, the monetary incentives for a qui
tam relator under the FCA and the business interests of a contractor who wants to continue working on government contracts
should sufficiently motivate disclosure. It is hard to imagine a
situation where a contractor would voluntarily disclose fraud
where no threat of litigation or business repercussions previously existed.
In light of the government's interest in recovering funds
through private enforcement suits to supplement its own limited
resources 43 and the questionable value of fraud disclosed prior
to execution of a release, the significant harm to FCA public
policy caused by enforcement of prefiling releases outweighs the
enforcement interest in encouraging settlements, even where
the government has a chance to investigate the allegations
40 See Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1170 n.8 (implying that the FCA compensatory interests have been protected since the government can still bring the action without
the relator).
41 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 11 (quoting Black, J. in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 n.5 (1943) (citation omitted)).
42 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2006).
43 See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1, 7, 23-24.
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before the settlement. The government's compensatory interests are inextricably tied with private enforcement suits, and disclosures motivated by promises of release enforceability do little
to enhance the government's likelihood of uncovering fraud.
Though the government still has the option to independently
bring a qui tam action where a release has been enforced, guilty
companies may be willing to bet that the government will not
thoroughly investigate or prosecute allegations due to lack of
resources." This potential loophole undermines the value of
the disclosure that the Hall analysis bases release enforceability
on since it frustrates the FCA's overall purpose of recovering
money. As evidenced by the government's minimum 70% proceeds interest in qui tam actions where it declines to intervene,
FCA policies extend considerably beyond the government's
awareness and investigation of fraud.4 5
The holding in Ritchie fails to fully consider the harm to FCA
policies caused by release enforcement and instead emphasizes
a contractor's disclosure of fraud allegations without examining
the context prompting the disclosure. The Ritchie court explained the need for a uniform federal approach to qui tam
FCA prefiling releases to preserve the government's right to recover under the FCA but presumed this right had been preserved because the government could still bring a qui tam action
against the contractor where the would-be relator could not.4 6
This ignores FCA policy interests in recovering losses from fraud
through private enforcement actions rather than relying on limited government resources. 4 7 The Ritchie court emphasized the
44 A recent report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) discussed how the large volume of audits undertaken by the limited resources of
DCAA has contributed to decreased audit quality and higher risk of undetected
and unchallenged fraud. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DCAA AUDITS:

WIDESPREAD PROBLEMS WITH AUDIT QuALrrY REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT REFORM

36

(2009). Another GAO report highlighted instances where significant deficiencies were removed from DCAA audits under pressure from the Department of
Defense and "contracting community" to issue "adequate" audit opinions. U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DCAA: ALLEGATIONS THAT CERTAIN AUDITS AT
THREE LOCATIONS DID NOT MEET PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS WERE SUBSTANTIATED

22-25, 29-33 (2008).
4 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2) (2006) (entitling qui tam relators to 25% to 30% of action or settlement proceeds where the government
chooses not to intervene).
46 United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1170
n.8 (10th Cir. 2009).
4 See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1, 7, 23-24.
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interest in encouraging disclosure of fraud allegations," but
such disclosure does not add value to the government's efforts
under the FCA. By adopting Hall, the Tenth Circuit opened the
door for government contractors and would-be relators to settle
claims more favorably than they might have in qui tam litigation, leaving the federal recovery of funds under the FCA to the
scarce resources of the government and thus frustrating the
compensatory purpose of the statute.
- Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1171.

